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North-Holland
DETERMINING THE ARBITRABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL
ANTITRUST DISPUTES
Laurence M. SMITH *
The Supreme Court has recently analyzed the difficulties inherent in determining the arbitrabdlity
of international antitrust disputes. This comment proposes an alternative analysis of the arbitration
issue by applying traditional court concerns about the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws
to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.
1. Introduction
Due to the proliferation of multinational transactions [1] and variations
among nations' antitrust policies [2], the issue of the arbitrability of antitrust
disputes pursuant to a valid agreement to arbitrate is of widespread concern.
Because the growth of international transactions in the world economy has
focused on the need for quick, efficient modes of dispute resolution [3], the
issue of the enforceability of an arbitration agreement seeking to resolve an
international antitrust dispute is of great concern both in the United States
and among its trading partners.
In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. [4], the United
States Supreme Court addressed this matter and held that antitrust claims
were arbitrable if the dispute was encompassed within a valid arbitration
clause in an international transaction [5]. Without criticizing the result reached
by the Supreme Court, this comment suggests an alternative method of
resolving the problem of the arbitrability of antitrust disputes.
First, the comment will examine the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (Convention) [6] and the effect of its
provisions on signatory nations. The next section discusses Scherk v. Alberto
Culver Co. [7], a 1974 Supreme Court decision interpreting the scope of the
Convention. The comment will then examine the issue of arbitrability of
antitrust disputes as evidenced by the Soler case. The comment will conclude
by setting forth an alternative manner of analyzing the Soler problem taking
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into account both the Convention and the extraterritorial application of U.S.
antitrust laws. This test should provide a principled manner of deciding the
issue of arbitrability as presented by Soler.
2. The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards
In 1970, the United States Congress adopted the Convention by enacting
Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (Arbitration Act) [8]. Initially
implemented in 1958 by forty-five nations [9], the Convention's primary goal
is "to encourage the recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration
agreements in international contracts and to unify the standards by which
agreements to arbitrate are observed and arbitral awards are enforced in the
signatory countries" [10].
The strong support for the Convention in the United States, both inside
and outside the government, was due to the perception that arbitration would
improve the ability of U.S. businessmen to engage in international trade [11].
The agreement to the simplified dispute resolution mechanism was perceived
as a more efficient manner of resolving international disputes than the usual
resort to the peculiarities of each individual nation's system of justice [12].
Arbitration was thus viewed as a mechanism of "settling disputes effectively,
quickly and with a minimum of international bitterness" [13].
2.1. The Provisions of the Convention
The most important innovation of the Convention is that it relaxed the
requirements needed to enforce an award issued under an arbitration agree-
ment. Under the Geneva Convention of the Execution of Foreign Arbitral
Awards of 1927 (Geneva Convention) [14], the international law existing prior
to the Convention, the party seeking enforcement had to prove to the
enforcing court that the award was final [15], and that enforcement had not
been suspended in the awarding country [16]. The Convention alters this
practice by requiring the party opposing enforcement to show cause why the
award should not be enforced [17]. Moreover, the Convention liberalizes the
conditions necessary for the enforcement of an award. While under the
Geneva Convention it was possible to challenge enforcement on many differ-
ent grounds [18], a court under the Convention may refuse enforcement only
on grounds specifically set out in Articles V and VI [19].
Before an arbitral agreement is subject to the Convention under U.S. law,
several criteria must be satisfied. First, there is a threshold requirement that
there be an agreement in writing to arbitrate the subject of the dispute and
that the subject of the dispute must be capable of being settled by arbitration
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[20]. Second, at least one party to the arbitral agreement must not be a citizen
of the United States or the commercial relation must have some reasonable
relation with one or more foreign states [21]. Third, the agreement cannot be
"null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed" [22]. If these
requirements are satisfied, then a court presented with a request to refer a
dispute to arbitration must order the dispute arbitrated [23].
The international bias of the Convention is limited by several provisions
that allow a signatory country to retain some discretion in the determination
of the arbitrability of a dispute. Certain laws of a nation prohibiting the
submission of certain questions to arbitration are taken into account by
Article II(1), which limits the applicability of the Convention to agreements
"concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration" [24].
Article 11(3) further accommodates the domestic concerns of a contracting
state by relieving a court of its duty to refer disputants to arbitration if the
court finds the agreement in violation of local law [25]. The provisions of
Article II are reinforced by Arcicle V(2) which gives a signatory country
grounds for not adhering to the Convention. Thus, a foreign award may be
disregarded if "the subject matter of the [dispute] is not capable of settlement
by arbitration under the law of that country" [26]. Article V(2)(b) permits the
competent authority of the country where enforcement is sought to disregard a
foreign award on the grounds of public policy [27].
2.2. Interpretation of the Convention in the U.S.
The Convention contains many phrases lacking precise, readily discernible
meanings [28]. Moreover, since the Convention was adopted by the United
States in 1970 [29], there have been few cases giving substance to the
Convention's language. Such limited guidance has led to inconsistent applica-
tions of the Convention. The judicial construction of the "null and void"
clause of Article II provides an illuminating example. In Ledee v. Ceramiche
Ragno [30], the First Circuit Court of Appeals construed the clause to
"encompass only those situations - such as fraud, mistake, duress, and waiver
- that can be applied neutrally on an international scale" [31]. But the district
court in Antco Shipping Co. v. Sidermar S.p.A. [32] held that this provision
required "a showing by the party resisting enforcement of the agreement that
the essence of the obligation or remedy [be] prohibited by a pertinent statute
or other declaration of public policy" [33]. In essence, the Antco court engrafted
the public policy exception of Article V onto Article 11(3) [34].
Like the "null and void" clause, the "nonarbitrable subject matter" lan-
guage of Article II(1) requires clarification. Commentators have reasoned that
the determination whether a dispute is amenable to the process of arbitration,
should be made pursuant to the law that the parties have chosen to govern
their disputes, or, in the absence of such a contractual stipulation, the law of
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the forum where the disputes are to be settled [35]. This approach does give
courts added guidance when defining ambiguous phrases; however, courts will
still be faced with the additional problem of deciding just what a particular
forum's law really is. In its official commentary to the Convention, the State
Department explains that this "nonarbitrable subject" provision was included
to take account of local laws such as state laws which prohibit artibrating
controversies affecting title to real property [36]. Moreover, the State Depart-
ment implies that any arbitral arrangement violating the provisions of Article
V would necessarily involve a dispute not capable of being settled by arbitra-
tion and would therefore fall under Article 11(1) [37]. The State Department,
like the court in Antco, derived meaning from language in the Convention,
particularly the "incapable of settlement by arbitration" clause, by applying
Article V [38].
Thus, it appears that the public policy concept of Article V is important in
providing the other sections with discernible meaning. In view of the central
importance of Article V, the concept of public policy should be clearly
delineated. Only when the contours of public policy are established will courts
be able to apply the provisions of Articles II and V in a consistent, predictable
manner [39]. In Transmarine Seaways Corp. o. Marc Rich & Co. A.G. [40] the
district court defined the term when it stated that "[a]greements exacted by
duress contravene the public policy of the nation ... and accordingly, duress,
if established, furnishes a basis for refusing enforcement of an award under
Article V(b)(2) of the Convention" [41]. The Transmarine court, however,
ruled that the burden of proving duress was a heavy one, necessitating a
showing that "a party is so overborne that it loses its options" [42]. This
decision is instructive in that it identifies duress as a legitimate public policy
ground for challenging an award and also because the exacting requirements
the court imposed on the defendant to prove duress, indicate the court's
reluctance to upset an arbitral award [43].
This tendency to construe the public policy defense narrowly is manifest in
numerous decisions; yet the case law does not set forth the specific situations
in which a court will disregard an award on grounds of public policy. The
holdings often articulate either broad, unworkable guidelines [44] or merely
rule out those situations in which the court deems the public policy exception
inapplicable [45]. Since the cases cannot satisfactorily define the parameters of
public policy, a functional definition must be derived from other sources.
A general principle giving the concept of public policy more substance is:
"where a legislature has expressly stated the grounds on which a court of law
may vacate an arbitrator's award, [the] court should practice self-restraint in
equating an alleged violation of 'public policy' with one of the statutory
grounds" [46]. This rule of construction is consistent with Chapter 2 of the
Arbitration Act, which provides in part, that "[t]he court shall confirm the
award unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition
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or enforcement of the award specified in the said convention" [47]. Yet,
despite the apparent limitation on the grounds for challenging an award to
those listed in Article V, Congress has implicitly recognized several other
grounds for refusing to enforce an arbitration award. In enacting the Conven-
tion, Congress approved the application of Chapter 1 [48] of the Arbitration
Act in arbitration disputes "to the extent that that [Chapter 1] is not in
conflict with [Chapter 2] or the Convention as ratified by the United States"
[49]. In Chapter 1, Congress enacted five grounds upon which a court may, on
he motion of the protesting party, vacate an arbiter's award [501. Thus, barring
any inconsistency, Chapter 1 implicitly expands the grounds on which a U.S.
court can entertain a public policy defense in enforcement actions falling
under the Convention. In short, these statutorily defined situations should
guide courts in ruling upon public policy defenses asserted to have an arbitral
award vacated.
The last Convention article that has been interpreted by the courts is
Article XIV. Article XIV contains the general reciprocity clause. It stipulates
that "[a] Contracting State shall not be entitled to avail itself of the present
Convention against other Contracting States except to the extent that it is
itself bound to apply the Convention" [51]. If the courts of one nation were to
abuse the "escape" clauses, Articles II and V, and trigger retaliatory responses
by other member nations, Article XIV may operate to discourage this abuse of
the discretion [52]. The reciprocity clause has been narrowly construed in
order to obtain acceptance of awards issued in the United States [53]. For
example, in Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Management, Inc. [54], the court
enforced an arbitral award issued in India, pursuant to the parties' agreement,
over the argument of the defendant asserting a lack of reciprocity as required
by Article XIV [55]. Rejecting the U.S. company's argument that the Indian
courts would not enforce an award rendered in the United States against the
Indian entity, the court found that the Indian courts were "functioning in a
responsible manner ... and will enforce awards against Indian parties" [56].
The district court construed the exceptions "narrowly lest foreign courts use
holdings against application of the Convention as a reason for refusing
enforcement of awards made in the United States" [57].
3. The Scherk Factor
Although the Convention provides general guidelines on the resolution of
the issue of arbitrability there are other analytic tools that should be consid-
ered. The United States Supreme Court's opinion in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver
Co. [58] suggests a theory that a U.S. court can apply in analyzing the
Convention's escape clauses [59].
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3.1. The Scherk Case
In Scherk, a Delaware corporation brought suit against Fritz Scherk, a
German citizen, accusing him of violating the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934 [60]. Because the parties had agreed contractually to submit controversies
of this nature to arbitration, Scherk moved to dismiss and initiated arbitration
proceedings [61]. The district court denied Scherk's motion to dismiss and
granted a preliminary order enjoining Scherk from proceeding with arbitration
[62]. In doing so the court relied upon the holding in Wilko v. Swan, [63] that
"an agreement to arbitrate could not preclude a buyer of a security from
seeking a judicial remedy under the Securities Act of 1933, in view of the
language of §14 of that Act" [64]. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that
"the agreement of the parties in this case to arbitrate any dispute arising out
of their international commercial transaction is to be respected and enforced
by the federal courts in accord with the explicit provisions of the Arbitration
Act" [65].
The Court's treatment of Wilko v. Swan is significant in outlining the
implications of its holding in Scherk. In Wilko, an action alleging defendant's
violation of the Securities Act of 1933 [66] by inducing plaintiff to purchase
stock through false representation [67], the Court held that section 14 of the
Securities Act, the anti-waiver clause [68], mandated that the dispute be
resolved in a judicial forum, despite the existence of a valid arbitration
agreement [69]. The Court reasoned that since the "protective provisions of
the Securities Act require the exercise of judicial discretion to fairly assure
their effectiveness, it seems to us that Congress must have intended Section 14
... to apply to waiver of judicial trial and review" [70].
Although Scherk involved alleged violations of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, the Supreme Court was confronted in Wilko with a similar anti-waiver
provision [71]. Even though the Court in Scherk conceded "that the operative
portions of the language of the 1933 Act relied upon in Wilko are contained in
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934" [72], it held that the arbitration agree-
ment must be honored by the parties [73]. The Court distinguished Wilko on
the grounds that both parties to the lawsuit were citizens of the Unites States
whereas Scherk involved a "truly international agreement" negotiated in the
United States, England, Germany and Austria and consummated in Switzer-
land between a U.S. corporation and a German citizen [74]. The Court noted
that the Wilko parties were aware from the outset that any disputes would be
governed by the U.S. securities laws and resolved in a United States district
court [75]. "In [Scherk], by contrast, in absence of the arbitration provision
considerable uncertainty existed at the time of the agreement ... concerning
the law applicable to the resolution of disputes arising out of the contract"
[76]. Thus, while the Wilko case involved a purely domestic dispute, Scherk
involved a dispute concerning an international transaction. The Court's moti-
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vation in Scherk, the desire to foster international trade, was absent in Wilko.
The Scherk court referred to the certainty imposed by an arbitration agree-
ment as "an almost indispensable precondition to achievement of the orderli-
ness and predictability essential to any international business transaction"
[77]. Alluding to the possibility of the parties bringing antagonistic actions in
the absence of an agreement to arbitrate, the Court remarked that "the dicey
atmosphere of such a legal no-man's-land would surely damage the fabric of
international commerce and trade, and imperil the willingness and ability of
businessmen to enter into international commercial agreements" [78].
Furthermore, in line with the international scope of the Scherk dispute, the
Supreme Court, quoting from its decision in Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.
[79], acknowledged that international trade and disagreements arising from
that trade cannot be governed exclusively by terms dictated by the United
States; such a position would "demean the standards of justice elsewhere in
the world, and unnecessarily exalts the primacy of United States law over the
laws of other countries" [801.
3.2. The Importance of Scherk
Even though the Supreme Court's decision in Scherk only briefly mentions
the Convention [81], the decision has broad implications as to the proper
treatment of certain Convention provisions in U.S. courts. Specifically, the
Court's holding suggests that courts should narrowly construe the Convention
provisions that can avoid enforcement of an arbitration agreement, especially
when domestic policies conflict with those of the Convention. In light of the
proliferation of international transactions [82] and the United States' desire to
foster their growth [83], the Supreme Court has not insisted upon the preemi-
nence of U.S. national concerns regardless or the repercussions that such a
position might have on foreign relations. The Supreme Court expressed the
need to acknowledge and respect the interests of other nations in Bremen [84]
and reaffirmed this conviction in Scherk by refusing to exalt U.S. securities
laws over considerations of facilitating international trade [85]. Although the
Convention would allow a signatory nation to assert the primacy of its law,
Scherk suggest that the U.S. courts will not blindly pursue this course.
3.3. Judicial Support for the Scherk Inference
The Supreme Court's suggestion that the Convention's escape clause be
narrowly construed has been adopted by several circuit courts of appeals in
construing the Convention provisions. For example, in LT.A.D. Associates,
Inc. v. Podor Bros. [86], the Fourth Circuit, citing Scherk, held that the "null
and void" clause of Article 11(3) should not be construed to allow for the
waiver of arbitration [87]. The appeals court, in reversing the lower court, held
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that the Indian partnership did not waive its contractual right to arbitrate even
though it filed the motion to compel arbitration just prior to the trial of the
contract claim [88].
Similarly, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in McCreary Tire & Rubber
Co. v. CEA T [891 concluded that the language of Article II demonstrated "the
firm commitment of the Congress to the elimination of vestiges of judicial
reluctance to enforce arbitration agreements, at least in the international
commercial context" [90].
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit adopted a similar
construction of the Convention in Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v.
Socitb Ghn~rale de l'Industrie du Papier [91]. In determining whether the
United States' diplomatic break with Egypt gave a court license under Article
V(2)(b) to disregard an arbitration agreement between U.S. and Egyptian
corporations, the court stressed that "[t]he general pro-enforcement bias
informing the Convention and explaining its supercession of the Geneva
Convention points toward a narrow reading of the public policy defense. An
expansive construction of the defense would vitiate the Convention's basic
effort to remove pre-existing obstacles to enforcement" [92]. Moreover, the
court cautioned that under Article XIV, the reciprocity provision of the
Convention, foreign nations could also adopt a broad reading of Article
V(2)(b) and thereby refuse enforcement of U.S. arbitration awards [93]. Thus,
in order to invoke the public policy doctrine consistently with the Convention,
the court limited the invocation to instances in which the forum state's most
basic notions of morality and justice were violated [94].
Consequently, the Supreme Court's holding in the 1985 Solar case was
decided against this backdrop of narrow judicial construction of the Conven-
tion's provision.
4. The Soler Case
On October 31, 1979, Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. (Soler), a Puerto Rican
corporation, entered into a Distributor Agreement with Chrysler International,
S.A. (CISA), a Swiss corporation. Pursuant to this agreement, Soler was to sell,
within a designated area of Puerto Rico, vehicles manufactured by Mitsubishi,
an entity formed by CISA and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Inc., a Japanese
corporation [95]. At the same time, CISA, Soler, and Mitsubishi entered into a
Sales Procedure Agreement (Sales Agreement) which, referring to the Distribu-
tor Agreement, provided for the direct sale of Mitsubishi products to Soler
[96]. Paragraph VI of the Sales Agreement, labeled "Arbitration of Certain
Matters" provided:
All disputes, controversies or differences which may arise between Mitsubishi and
Soler out of or in relation to Articles I-B through V of this Agreement or for the
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breach thereof, shall be finally settled by arbitration in Japan in accordance with the
rules and regulations of the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association 1971.
Due to a slack in the new-car market in early 1981, Soler was having
difficulty meeting its minimum sales volume and in the spring of that year
requested that Mitsubishi delay or cancel shipment of several orders [98]. At
the same time, Soler tried to arrange for the transshipment of automobiles to
the continental United States and Latin America. Mitsubishi, however, denied
permission to so divert the vehicles [99]. Mitsubishi eventually withheld
shipment of 966 vehicles, responsibility for which Soler disclaimed in 1982
[100].
Mitsubishi sued Soler in the United States District Court for the District of
Puerto Rico for an order to compel arbitration before the Japan Commercial
Arbitration Association [101]. Soler denied the allegations and counterclaimed
against Mitsubishi and CISA alleging that they had violated the Sherman Act
by conspiring to divide markets in restraint of trade [1021.
The district court ordered that all of the issues in the complaint and
counterclaim that fell within the parties' arbitration clause be submitted to
arbitration [103]. With regard to the antitrust charges, the court, relying upon
Scherk, held that the international character of the Mitsubishi-Soler undertak-
ing required that these claims should also be arbitrated [104].
The court of appeals reversed the district court citing American Safety
Equipment Corp. v. J.P. McGuire & Co. [105] for the proposition that antitrust
claims are not subject to arbitration [106]. The court reasoned that neither
Scherk nor the Convention required the abondenment of this doctrine in an
international setting [107].
The Unites States Supreme Court reversed the First Circuit and held that
"concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and
transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international com-
mercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes require that we
enforce the parties' agreement" [108]. Citing Bremen and Scherk and the
United States' implementation of the Convention, the Court noted the strong
federal policy in favor of arbitration dispute resolution [1091.
The Court also expressed skepticism about the American Safety Equipment
doctrine [110]. In assessing this doctrine, the Court reasoned that if a contract
which generated an antitrust dispute was in fact a contract of adhesion, a
party could directly attack its validity on grounds such as fraud, undue
influence or overwhelming bargaining power [111]. In response to the Ameri-
can Safety Equipment concern that the potential complexity of antitrust
disputes makes them ill-adapted to the arbitral process, the Court noted that
antitrust disputes are not inherently unsusceptible to resolution by arbitration
[112]. The Court also noted that parties entering an arbitration agreement
assume that streamlined proceedings and expeditious results will best serve
their needs [113]. Moreover, believing that competent, conscientious and
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impartial arbitrators can be obtained [1141, the Court also discounted the
argument that decisions on the antitrust regulation of business should not be
vested in arbitrators who are often members of the business community [115].
Finally, the Court reasoned that treble damages, available in antitrust proceed-
ings, could be sought in an arbitration tribunal [116]. If an arbitration panel
did not accord this statutory claim proper attention, a U.S. court could,
pursuant to Article V(2)(b) of the Convention, refuse to enforce a resultant
arbitral award as contrary to U.S. public policy [117]. Therefore, the Court
held that the elements of the American Safety Equipment doctrine were not
compelling enough to outweigh the Unites States' policy favoring the resolu-
tion of disputes through the arbitration process [118].
5. A Two-part Test to Resolve the Issue of Arbitrability
The Supreme Court resolved the question of the arbitrability of interna-
tional antitrust disputes with little reference to the Convention and the case
law interpreting its provisions. The Court essentially analyzed the issue in a
balancing test when it
weigh[ed] the concerns of American Safety against a strong belief in the efficacy of
arbitral procedures for the resolution of international commercial disputes and an
equal commitment to the enforcement of freely negotiated choice-of-forum clauses
[119].
In espousing a balancing test, the Court's decision does not provide for a
principled method of resolving the arbitrability of international antitrust
disputes. This comment proposes a two-part test that takes into account both
Convention and antitrust law in seeking a principled manner of resolving the
issue.
5.1. Part One: The Antitrust Prong
The first prong [120] of the test complex a court to assess the international
ramifications of disregarding an arbitral agreement and resolving the dispute
in U.S. courts under U.S. antitrust law. If the court finds that the potential for
negative international repercussions is minimal, the court can assert jurisdic-
tion and accommodate the policy favoring the judicial resolution of antitrust
disputes. But if the court determines that the extraterritorial application of
U.S. antitrust laws would create international repercussions, the court should
refrain from exerting jurisdiction over the dispute and proceed with part two
of the test.
5.1.2. Factors to Consider in the Determination of the "Acceptance" of the
Application of U.S. Antitrust Laws
The crucial determination in the first part of the test is whether or not the
extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws would be accepted by the
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foreign state whose citizen is attempting to arbitrate the controversy [121]. The
extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws is relevant because if a court
rejects an attempt to arbitrate the dispute, the foreign entity would have to
defend claims of antitrust violations in U.S. courts. Moreover, many foreign
nations have fiercely resisted the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust
laws [122]. The problem arises frequently since many countries condone
business practices which the U.S. antitrust laws prohibit [123].
In analyzing disputes over the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust
law, the U.S. courts have adopted a balancing approach, weighing the interests
of all the nations involved in the dispute [124]. In Mannington Mills, Inc. v.
Congoleum Corp. [125], the Third Circuit set forth ten considerations that
should guide the trial court's determination of the question of jurisdiction over
an entity located outside the United States. They are:
(1) Degree of conflict with foreign law or policy;
(2) Nationality of the parties;
(3) Relative importance of the alleged violation of conduct here compared
to that abroad;
(4) Availability of a remedy abroad and the pendency of litigation there;
(5) Existence of intent to harm or affect American commerce and its
foreseeability;
(6) Possible effect upon foreign relations if the court exercises jurisdiction
and grants relief;
(7) If relief is granted, whether a party will be placed in the position of
being forced to perform an act illegal in either country or be under
conflicting requirements by both countries;
(8) Whether the court can make its order effective;
(9) Whether an order for relief would be acceptable in this country if made
by the foreign nation under similar circumstances;
(10) Whether a treaty with the affected nations has addressed the issue
[1261.
Although critics have taken issue with this "laundry list" of factors [1271,
several elements have emerged as controlling factors. For example, the first
factor, the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, has been given
considerable weight in the balancing process [128]. In accordance with this
factor, U.S. courts would decline to exercise jurisdiction in order to avert
international friction. Likewise, the sixth factor could also be given much
weight in the balancing test [129]. Lastly, considerable weight is given to the
fifth factor, the existence of intent to harm or affect U.S. commerce and its
foreseeability [130]. This factor, a reformulation of the "effects test" as
originally articulated by Judge Learned Hand in United States o. Aluminum Co.
of America [131], is significant because the United States interest in applying
its antitrust laws is nonexistent if U.S. commerce is completely unaffected by
the disputed transaction.
207
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In short, the Mannington Mills test is relevant in analyzing the first prong
of the test, i.e., whether the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws
would be acceptable in a given situation. Like the concerns motivating the
Scherk opinion, [132] the Mannington Mills approach does not subordinate
international considerations to domestic policies in resolving an international
dispute.
5.2. Part Two: The Convention Prong
The second prong of the proposed test requires the U.S. court to analyze
the arbitration agreement under Chapters 1 and 2 of the Arbitration Act and
the Convention. If the agreement does not violate any of those provisions, the
court must honor the agreement and either enforce a validly issued award or
compel arbitration. If the agreement violates any of these provisions, particu-
larly the escape clauses of Articles 11 and V of the Convention and Chapter 1
of the Arbitration Act, then the court must void the agreement under Article
II [133]. In accordance with the Scherk opinion, courts should narrowly
construe the exemptions invalidating agreements to arbitrate [134]. The lesson
of Scherk is that due to the international context of these types of disputes,
courts should not apply U.S. policies without consideration of the interna-
tional implications at stake. Rather, courts should consider the international
ramifications of a decision to forgo arbitration to accommodate domestic U.S.
interests [135]. Scherk compels the courts to use the escape clauses sparingly
in determining the arbitrability of international antitrust disputes [136]. In
other words, the United States' deep-seated concern with maintaining interna-
tional harmony to enhance commerce should balance any tendency the courts
may have to vindicate U.S. antitrust policy by requiring judicial resolution of
such disputes.
5.3. Application of the Test to the Soler Controversy
Utilizing this comment's two-part test, a court faced with the Soler dispute
would reach the same result as the Supreme Court, but in a principled manner.
As to the first part, a court would likely find that the extraterritorial applica-
tion of U.S. antitrust laws would create serious international repercussions.
The dispute in Soler involved corporations from Switzerland and Japan. Both
Switzerland [137] and Japan [138] have antitrust policies that tolerate business
activity that restricts competition. In other words, the first Manninglon Mills
factor is implicated since U.S. antitrust law is directly in conflict with the
antitrust policy of the foreign states involved in the dispute. Moreover, both
Japan and Switzerland have been sensitive to the extraterritorial application of
U.S. antitrust laws in the past, thus implicating the sixth Mannington Mills
factor [139]. Lastly, the fifth Mannington Mills factor is invoked in Soler.
208
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Soler Chrysler's antitrust allegation, that Mitsubishi and CISA had conspired
to divide up the U.S. auto markets in restraint of trade, if true would have a
large foreseeable impact on U.S. commerce. Because the extraterritorial appli-
cation of U.S. antitrust laws would create international friction, a court faced
with the Soler dispute should refrain from exerting jurisdiction over the
controversy and proceed to part two.
As to the second prong, a court narrowly construing the escape clauses of
the Convention and the Arbitration Act, would find that the parties' agree-
ment does not violate any of the Convention's provisions. In resisting Mitsu-
bishi's motion to compel arbitration, Soler Chrysler did not allege any grounds
from which a court could deny the Convention mandate. There is no allega-
tion that the agreement was not validly entered into nor is there any hint that
the distribution and sales agreements were in any way in violation of any
public policy. Thus, a court would hold the agreement valid and compel
arbitration of the antitrust dispute.
In sum, a court faced with the Soler dispute would have a principled
manner of assessing the competing interests to hold the international antitrust
dispute arbitrable.
6. Conclusion
In order to streamline the resolution of commercial disputes and stimulate
international commercial transactions, the United States adopted the Conven-
tion in 1970. Because U.S. antitrust laws differ from the antitrust policies of
our trading partners, the arbitrability of international antitrust disputes is
important if the goals and policies of the Convention are to be upheld. The
Supreme Court in Soler analyzed the issue of arbitrability, but it did so in an
unprincipled manner. This comment seeks to propose a principled approach
by considering the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws and the
pertinent Convention provision. In this way parties to an international com-
mercial transaction will have certainty as to the forum that will adjudicate the
dispute.
Notes
[1] See. e.g., Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United
States 834-37 (1984).
[2] See infra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
[3] See infra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
[41 105 S.Ct. 3346 (1985).
[5] Id. at 3355, 3361.
16) Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. opened for
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signature June 10, 1958,21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997,330 U.N.T.S. 4739 [hereinafter cited as
Convention]. The United States acceded to the Convention in 1970 when Congress adopted
Chapter 2 to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1982).
171 417 U.S. 506, reh'g denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974).
[8] 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1982); see Comment, International CommercialArbitration Under the
United Nations Convention and the Amended Federal Arbitration Statute, 47 Wash. L. Rev. 441, 454
(1972) ("[Tlhe 1925 Act [9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14] was not considered a reliable statutory basis for
enforcement of the provisions of the Convention, and apparently for this reason the 1970 Act [9
U.S.C. §§ 201-208] was considered necessary."]; see Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Report
on the Convention on Foreign Arbitral Awards, S. Exec. Rep. No. 10, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2
(1968).
[9] See Message From the President of the United States Transmitting the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, S. Exec. Doc. E, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3
(1968) (Letter of Submittal by Hon. Nicholas D. Katzenbach) [hereinafter cited Exec. Doc. E].
Since the time of the initial signing, a total of 66 nations have become parties to the Convention.
For a complete listing of the signatory nations see U.S. Dep't of State, Treaties in Force: A List of
Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 1984,
202 (1984).
[10] Scherk, 417 U.S. at 520; see Exec. Doc. E, supra note 9, at 4 (Letter of Submittal by
'Nicholas D. Katzenbach).
[11] See Letter from Donald B. Straus to Hon. Dean Rusk (March 1, 1966), reprinted in Exec.
Doc. B, supra note 9, at 41. Mr. Straus, then president of the American Arbitration Association,
in a 1966 letter to the Secretary of State, commented that
[t]here is a growing interest on the part of businessmen throughout the world in the
use of arbitration to settle commercial disputes. The increasing volume of trade, the
complexity of modem commercial contracts, and the tangled and conflicting laws of
the trading nations, all contribute to the advantages arbitration has over litigation in
different countries, for settling disputes effectively, quickly and with a minimum of
international bitterness.
Id.
[12] Id.
[131 Id.
[14] Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1927, 92 LNTS 301
[hereinafter cited as Geneva Convention].
[151 Id. art. I, para. 2(d).
[16] Id. art. II, para. 1(a).
[171 Convention, supra note 6, at V. The proponent of the award must:
1. File an application for recognition and enforcement of the award with the
competent authority in the contracting state;
2. Supply the duly authenticated original award or a duly certified copy;
3. Supply the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy; and
4. Supply, if appropriate, a translation of the award and agreement, which may be
certified by an official or sworn translator or by a diplomatic or consular agent.
Quigley, Convention on Foreign Arbitral Awards, 58 A.B.A.J. 821, 824 (1972).
[18] See Geneva Convention, supra note 14.
[19] Convention, supra note 6, arts. V, VI.
120] Id. art. II(1)-(2). In adopting the reservations of Article 1(3), the United States opted to
apply the Convention only to legal agreements arising out of a commercial relationship. 9 U.S.C. §
202 (1982). Article 1(3) sets out the reservations a ratifying nation may adhere to:
When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention, or notifying extension
under article X hereof, any State may on the basis of reciprocity declare that it will
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apply the Convention to the recognition and enforcement of awards made only in
the territory of another Contracting State. It may also declare that it will apply the
Convention only to differences arising out of legal relationships, whether contrac-
tual or not, which are considered as commercial under the national law of the State
making such declaration.
Convention, supra note 6, art. 1(3).
121] 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1982):
An agreement or award arising out of such a [commercial] relationship which is
entirely between citizens of the United States shall be deemed not to fall under the
Convention unless that relationship ... has some other reasonable relation with one
or more foreign states.
[221 Convention, supra note 6, art. 11(3). Article 11(3) declares:
The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect
of which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this article,
shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it
finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being
performed.
This provision and Article 11(1), which stipulates that to be recognized an agreement must
pertain to a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration, allow member nations to insulate
certain disputes from the arbitral process. Along with Article V, which enumerates seven grounds
upon which a foreign award may be challenged, td. art. V, these exemption clauses, if applied
indiscretely, could frustrate the aims of the Convention. See supra notes 8-13 and accompanying
text.
[23] Id. art. 11(3).
[24] Id. art. 11(1); Article II(1) provides:
Each contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under which the
parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or
which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether
contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration.
See Exec. Doe. E, supra note 9, at 19.
[25] The court can refuse to enforce the agreement pursuant to the "null and void" clause in
Article 11(3). Id. art. 11(3).
[26] Id. art. V(2)(a).
127] Id. art. V(2)(b).
Authorities have suggested that exceptions of Article V may be read into Article II, in light of
the anomaly that might arise whereby a court would have to refer parties to arbitration, but then
refuse to enforce any resulting award under the public policy exception of Article V(2)(b); see,
e.g., G. Haight, Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards:
Summary Analysis of Record of United Nations Conference, May/June 1958, 1, 28 (1958);
(Courts "may find an agreement incapable of performance if it offends the law or the public
policy of the forum."); Exec. Doe. E, supra note 9, at 21 (If broadly construed, these provisions
would provide a court much latitude in refusing to recognize and enforce arbitral agreements and
awards.)
[28] For example, the phrases "null and void," "in operation or incapable of being performed,"
"subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration," and "contrary to ... public policy ... " lack
precise meaning and thus could be construed in a number of ways. See infra notes 28-56 and
accompanying text.
[29] Pub. L No. 91-368, 84 Stat. 692 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1982)).
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130] 684 F. 2d 184 (1st Cir. 1982).
[31] Id. at 187.
[32] 417 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Antco involved a commercial contract of affreightment
between Sidermar, an Italian shipowner, and Antco Shipping Co. (Antco), a Bahamian charterer.
When a dispute arose, Sidermar initiated arbitration proceedings pursuant to the arbitration
clause contained in the agreement. Antco moved to stay the arbitral proceedings, claiming that
Sidermar's exclusion of the State of Israel as a designated loading port was desired by Siderman to
win favor with the Arab world and that this action offended the public policy of the United
States. The district court held that despite the provision concerning Israel, the contract was subject
to arbitration noting that the public policy defense should be construed narrowly. Id. at 215.
[33] Id. (emphasis added).
[34] The Anico court's mode of construction is consistent with Haight's theory as to how
courts should apply these provisions, see supra note 26 and accompanying text, and underscores
the importance of "public policy" to the overall workings of the Convention.
[35] Eg., Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 Yale LJ. 1049, 1064 n. 70 (1961).
[36] S. Exec. Doc. E, supra note 9, at 19.
[371 Id.
(381 Id.
[39] For an example of a court invoking the public policy defense according to its own varying
perceptions, see Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 43 Cal. 2d 788, 278 P. 2d 905 (1955). In Black both
the majority and the dissent justified their decisions on public policy.
[40] 480 F. Supp. 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Transmarine involved a contract, containing an
arbitration clause, in which Marc Rich & Co. A.G. (Rich) chartered a vessel owned by
Transmarine Seaways Corp. of Monrovia (Transmarine) to load a cargo of crude oil at a Persian
Gulf port for discharge into a larger tanker. Transmarine refused to proceed to Hormuz Island as
the location of discharge. The resulting dispute between the parties was settled by arbitrators in
Transmarine's favor. Transmarine moved for an order confirming the award. Rich, on the other
hand, moved to vacate the award, alleging the contract was tainted by duress. The district court
held that Rich had not met its burden of establishing duress and entered judgment in favor of
Transmarine. Id. at 361.
[41] Id. at 358 (citations omitted).
[42] Id. at 359.
[43] Another case which is helpful in defining public policy is La Soci~t Nationale v. Shaheen
Natural Resources Co., 585 F. Supp. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), affd, 733 F. 2d 260 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 251 (1984). The defendant there sought to have the arbitrators' award vacated as
contrary to public policy alleging that the parties' underlying contract was a "per see violation of
the antitrust laws." The court found it unnecessary to determine whether the contract in fact
violated the Sherman Act, but noted in general that "[alntitrust arguments interposed as a defense
to a contract action ... traditionally have been viewed with disfavor." Id. at 63. Because of the
summary manner in which the court disposed of the defendant's argument, one cannot infer with
any degree of certainty whether courts will recognize an antitrust claim as a valid public policy
defense. The case does illustrate the inclination of courts to restrict the use of public policy as a
means of circumventing the arbitral process.
[44] See, e.g., Parsons & Whitlemore Overseas Co. v. Socit6 G~ndrale de l'Industrie du
Papier, 508 F. 2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974) ("Enforcement ... may be denied ... 'only where
enforcement would violate ... basic notions of morality and justice.").
[45] See infra notes 78-87 and accompanying text.
(46] Meiners, Arbitration Awards and "Public Policy", 17 Arb. J. 145, 161 (1962).
[47] 9 U.S.C. § 207 (1982). The grounds for refusing to enforce an award are set forth in
Article V of the Convention. A court may refuse to enforce an award "at the request of the party
against whom it is invoked only if that party furnishes to the competent authority where the
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recognition and enforcement is sought proof" that: (a) the parties to the agreement were "under
some incapacity" or the agreement is not valid under the law governing the agreement; (b) the
party against whom the award is invoked was denied proper notice of the appointment of the
arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; (c) the
award deals with a dispute beyond the scope of the arbitration clause as defined by the parties of
the arbitral decision exceeds the scope of the controversy submitted; (d) the composition of the
arbitral authority or the arbitral proceeding was contrary to the rules governing the agreement;
and (e) the award has not yet become binding or has been set aside or suspended by a competent
authority. Convention, supra note 6, art. V(1).
Pursuant to article V(2) a court may refuse to enforce an award, without proof from the
contesting party, if the
competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement finds that
(a) the subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration
under the law of that country; or (b) the recognition or enforcement of the award
would be contrary to the public policy of that country.
Id.
[48] 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14.
[49] Id. § 208; see Comment, supra note 8, at 485.
1501 9 U.S.C. §§ 10(a)-(e). A court may refuse to enforce an award:
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of
them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, and in refusing to hear evidence pertinent
and material to the controversy; or any other misbehavior by which the rights of
any party have been prejudiced.
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them
that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was
not made.
(e) Where an award was vacated and the time within which the agreement required
the award to be made has not expired the court may, in its discretion, direct a
rehearing by the arbitrators.
See also Comment, supra note 8, at 486 ("Thus, the scheme developed for enforcement of foreign
arbitration awards ... provides the defendant with a network of protection which ... includes that
available for enforcement of domestic awards," as well as that provided by the Convention itself.).
[511 Convention, supra note 6, art. XIV.
[52] Comment, supra note 8, at 486-87.
[53] See generally id. (arguing that the liberal invocation of the exception clauses should be
tempered by the "desire to obtain the widest acceptance of America's awards among the courts of
other signatory states, which also have the loopholes available to them.").
[54] 517 F. Supp. 948 (S.D. Ohio 1981). IDI contracted to build a nitrophosphate plant near
Bombay, India, for the Fertilizer Corporation of India (FCI). After the facility was built, a dispute
arose concerning the quantity of daily production from the plant. According to the parties'
agreement, FCI requested arbitration proceedings that resulted in an award in India in FCI's
favor. FCI brought this petition under the Convention to enforce the award.
[551 Id. at 952.
[56] Id. at 953.
[57] Id. (citations omitted).
[58] 417 U.S. 506 (1973).
[59] See supra note 47.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
LM. Smith / Arbitrability of international antitrust disputes
[60] 417 U.S. at 508-09. Plaintiff claimed that Scherk, in violation of § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982), fraudulently misrepresented certain trademark
rights that he had sold to Alberto-Culver as being unencumbered when, in fact, these rights were
subject to substantial encumbrances.
[61] Scherk, 417 U.S. at 510 & n.2.
[62] Id.
[63] 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
[64] Scherk, 417 U.S. at 510.
[65] Id. at 519-20.
[66] Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982).
[67] 346 U.S. at 429-30.
[68] 15 U.S.C. § 77cc(a) (1982).
[69] 346 U.S. at 437. The agreement between plaintiff and defendant contained a clause
providing "that arbitration ... be the method of settling all future controversies." Id. at 429-30.
[70] Id. at 437. The Court thus voided the arbitration provision in the agreement.
[71] Compare Section 29(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1982),
which provides: "Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance
with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an
exchange required thereby shall be void." with Section 14 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77n (1982), which provides: "Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person
acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of the rules
and regulations of the Commission shall be void."
[72] Scherk, 417 U.S. at 515.
[73] Id. at 519-20.
[74] Id. at 515.
[751 Id.
[76] Id. at 516.
[771 Id.
[78] Id. at 517.
[79] 407 U.S. 1 (1972) (emphasis added).
[80] Sherk, 417 U.S. at 517, n. 11.
[81] See id. at 520 n. 15. The Court alluded to the Convention, enacted after the controversy
arose:
Without reaching the issue of whether the Convention ... would require of its own
force that the agreement to arbitrate be enforced in the present case, we think that
this country's adoption and ratification of the Convention and the passage of
Chapter 2 of the United States Arbitration Act provide strongly persuasive evidence
of congressional policy consistent with the decision we reach today.
[82] See supra note 1.
[83] See, e.g., The 1985 State of the Union Address, 21 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 140, 145
(Feb. 6, 1985). In his speech, President Reagan remarked:
We have seen the benefits of free trade and lived through the disasters of protection-
ism. Tonight, I ask all our trading partners, developed and developing alike, to join
us in a new round of trade negotiations to expand trade and competition, and
strengthen the global economy - and to begin it in the next year.
[84] See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
[85] See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
[86] 636 F. 2d 75 (4th Cir. 1981). I.T.A.D. Associates, Inc. (I.T.A.D.), a New York corpora-
tion, brought an action against Podar Bros., a partnership with its principal place of business in
Bombay, India, for allegedly breaching a contract to supply I.T.A.D. with textiles. Unable to
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attend, the partnership set and then rescheduled several trial dates. On the day prior to trial.
Podar Bros. removed the action to federal district court and then filed a motion to compel
arbitration pursuant to Chapter 2 of the U.S. Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 205-208 (1982). The
district court rule that although the parties had contractually agreed to arbitrate, Podar Bros. had
waived its contractual right through its conduct of apparent acquiescence to litigation. 636 F. 2d
at 76.
[87] 636 F. 2d at 77.
[88] Id.
[891 501 F. 2d 1032 (3d Cir. 1974). In McCreary, plaintiff McCreary Tire & Rubber Company
(McCreary), a Pennsylvania corporation, sued CEAT S.p.A. (CEAT), an Italian corporation, for
allegedly breaching a distributorship contract. CEAT moved to have the action stayed to permit
arbitration of the dispute in accordance with the terms of the contract upon which McCreary
sued. Believing the arbitration issue was discretionary under the terms of the Convention, the
district court denied CEAT's motion. Id. at 1033, 1036. The appeals court reversed. Id. at 1037.
[90] Id. Although the issue in McCreary was whether or not the district court's decision to
refer the parties to arbitration under Article II was discretionary, the opinion is illustrative of the
court's inclination to interpret the Convention provisions to enhance international trade.
[91] 508 F. 2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974). Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. (Overseas), a U.S.
corporation, contracted with Soci&t6 Gn~rale de l'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), and Egyptian
corporation, to construct and manage for one year, a paperboard mill in Alexandria, Egypt. The
parties included an arbitration clause in their agreement. Performance of the contract was
interrupted by the Arab-Israeli Six Day War and Egyptian hostility to Americans. The Egyptian
government broke diplomatic ties with the United States and ordered all U.S. citizens expelled
from Egypt; they could, however, apply and qualify for a special visa. Overseas' efforts to secure
such a visa were no more than perfunctory. Claiming that the postponement in performance was
not due to causes beyond Overseas' reasonable capacity to control and thus, not excused by the
"force majeure" clause of the contract, RAKTA sought damages for breach of contract. RAKTA
initiated arbitration proceedings that culminated in an award for RAKTA. Overseas brought suit
seeking a declaratory judgment to prevent RAKTA from collecting the award out of a letter of
credit issued in RAKTA's favor by the Bank of America at Overseas' request. RAKTA counter-
claimed to confirm and enter judgment on the arbitration award. The district court ruled in favor
of RAKTA. Overseas appealed from this decision on several grounds, one of which was that
enforcing the award would violate the public policy of the United States.
[92] Id. at 973.
[931 Id. at 973-74.
[94] Id. at 974.
[95] Soler, 105 S. Ct. at 3349.
[961 Id.
[971 Id.
198] Id.
[991 Id. at 3349-50.
[100] Id. at 3350.
[101] Id.
[102] Id.
[103] Id. at 3351.
[1041 Id.
[105] 391 F. 2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968). In American Safety Equipment, the Second Circuit held
that antitrust claims were inappropriate for resolution in the arbitration process. Id. at 826. The
court set out several reasons proclaiming an antitrust exception to the national policy in favor of
arbitration. First, "a claim under the antitrust laws is not merely a private matter; the Sherman
Act is designed to promote the national interest in a competitive economy." Id. Furthermore,
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because antitrust violations could conceivably affect hundreds of thousands or millions of people,
the court reasoned that Congress would not have intended "such claims to be resolved elsewhere
than in the courts." Id. at 827. Third, the court found that antitrust issues are "prone to be
complicated and the evidence extensive and diverse." Id. Additionally, the court noted that
decisions regarding "antitrust regulation of business are too important to be lodged in arbitrators
chosen from the business community." The court also observed that contracts generating antitrust
disputes may be contracts of adhesion, and, therefore, automatic forum determination by such
contracts was inappropriate. Lastly, the court noted the vast public interest vested in an antitrust
controversy which, together with the other considerations, mandated judicial enforcement of the
antitrust laws.
[106] Soler, 723 F. 2d 155, 162-63 (1st Cir. 1983), aff'd in part and rei'd in part, 105 S. CL
3346 (1985).
[107] Id.
[108] Soler, 105 S. Ct. at 3355.
[109] Id. at 3356-57.
[110] Id. at 3357. The major shortcoming in the First Circuit's Soler opinion is its assertion
that the American Safety Equipment doctrine applies with equal force to international antitrust
disputes. The court assumed that the existence in international antitrust controversies of the
factors underlying the U.S. antitrust arbitration exception would justify the court in extending the
doctrine to the context of the Soler case. But a careful analysis of the Sdcerk and Wilko opinions
illustrates the fallacies in the First Circuit's reasoning.
To varying degrees, the same considerations deemed sufficient to give rise to the antitrust
exception in domestic disputes are present in cases involving violations of the U.S. securities laws.
Disregard of the securities laws can also touch the lives of many who are not directly injured by
the act in question. See, eg., SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F. 2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947) (violation of
§ 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 affected more than 150,000 persons). Moreover, the
securities laws, like antitrust legislation, pose complex substantive, procedural, and evidentiary
issues. Lastly, the national interest in enforcing the securities laws is as high a national priority as
assuring compliance with the antitrust laws. See Regulation of Securities, S. Rep. No. 47, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1933).
But despite the fact that Congress explicitly provided for securities disputes to be resolved in a
judicial forum, Securities Act of 1933 § 22(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1982), and the Wilko holding
that this provision gives rise to a preeminent right to have a dispute settled in federal court, 346
U.S. at 438, the Supreme Court in Scherk found that in international securities disputes the Wilko
concerns are outweighed by concerns and necessities of international trade, and held the
agreement to arbitrate was valid. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 510. See supra notes 57-70 and accompany-
ing text.
[111] Soler, 105 S. Ct. at 3357.
[112] Id. at 3357-58.
[113] Id.
[1141 Id. at 3358.
[1151 Id.
[116] Id. at 3358-59.
[1171 Id. at 3360.
[118] Id. at 3357.
[119] Id.
[120] This test does not reject the Supreme Court's general framework. The Court affirmed the
First Circuit "approach which sought to first determine whether the parties agreement to arbitrate
reached the issues involved in the dispute and if it did then consider whether external legal
constraints foreclose arbitration of the claims. Id. at 3355. This comment prefers to provide a
principled manner of analyzing the issue once it is determined that the arbitration agreement
covers the issues in dispute.
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(121) See generally J. Atwood & K. Brewster. Antitrust and American Business Abroad (2d
ed. 1981) (treatise description of the controversy surrounding the extraterritorial application of
U.S. antitrust laws); Cannon, Laker Airways and the Courts: A New Method of Blocking the
Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antttrust Laws, 7 J. Comp. Bus. & Cap. Mkt. L. 63 (1985)
(analyzing the controversy over the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws in recent
Laker Airways antitrust litigation); Davidlow, Extraterritorial Antitrust and Concept of Comty, 15
J. World Trade L. 500, 502 (1981) (noting that "there have been five diplomatic protests of U.S.
antitrust cases for every instance of express diplomatic support, and three blocking statutes for
every cooperation agreement.").
[1221 See Circa, The Challenge of Foreign Laws to Block American Antitrust Actions, 18 Stan. J.
Int'l L. 247 (1982); Pettit & Styles, The International Response to the Extraterritorial Application of
United States Antitrust Laws, 37 Bus. Law. 697, 711-14 (1982) (outlining the so-called blocking
statutes, acts which prevent the application of U.S. antitrust laws within the foreign nation's
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Trade Practices Act of 1974, Austl. Acts No. 81; Act Against Restraints on
Competition, BGBI 869 (1974) (W. Ger.).
The most prominent of the blocking statutes is the British Protection of Trading Interest Act,
see Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, which serves three basic purposes. First, it
blocks U.S. discovery requests. Second, the act blocks enforcement in the U.K. of foreign
judgments for multiple damages against British defendants. Lastly, the Act allows British
defendants to recover the punitive portion of any foreign multiple damage judgment. This last
element, a "clawback" provision, is a "retaliatory measure aimed primarily at American treble
damage actions." Circa, supra at 249; see also, Cannon, supra note 120 (outlining application of
the British blocking statute in the Laker Airway antitrust litigation).
[1231 For example, British law allows the predatory pricing scheme which drove Laker
Airways out of business. See Cannon, supra note 120, at 64-72.
[124] There is considerable support within the United States for the balancing approach which
takes into account the competing interests of foreign states. The U.S. has entered into bilateral
agreements with Australia, see Agreement Relating to Cooperation on Antitrust Matters, United
States-Australia, June 29, 1982, T.I.A.S. No. 10365, and West Germany, see Agreement Relating
to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Destructive Business Practices, June 23, 1976, United
States-West Germany, 27 U.S.T. 1956, T.I.A.S. No. 8291, whereby both signatories pledged
mutual respect for the other's "national" interests. Moreover, the Justice Department has adopted
the approach which weighs the concerns of foreign nations before extending the reach of U.S.
antitrust laws to international disputes. Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Guide for
International Operations (1977); see also Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of
the United States § 40 (1965); Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
(Revised) §§ 402, 403, 415 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981) (enumerating factors to be considered in
balancing the propriety of asserting jurisdiction over a foreign nation in an antitrust dispute).
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